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1 Introduction
The campaign for the German parliament (Bundestag) 2017 was finally the one in which party
strategists and observers regarded social media not just as experimental and in essence peripheral
venues, but rather as important arenas where elections are won or lost. The year before, Donald
Trump won the presidency in the U.S., which was attributed to his authentic Twitter use and a skill-
ful mobilization of supporters via social media. Right-wing populist forces on the rise in Germany
like the AfD or Pegida similarly use social media to bypass media gatekeepers and reach sympa-
thetic target audiences (Stier, Posch, Bleier, & Strohmaier, 2017). So-called ‘‘fake news’’, social bots
(semi-automated accounts) and online propaganda (e.g., orchestrated by Russia), accompanied by
a growing mistrust of legacy media in the wake of the refugee crisis threatened to impact the cam-
paign. The agenda-setting power of online media (Russell Neuman, Guggenheim, Mo Jang, & Bae,
2014) became apparent when an online campaign led by party activists helped to propel Martin
Schulz and the SPD to a parity with the CDU in public opinion polls in March 2017 (‘‘Schulzzug’’).
In the campaigning arena, parties applied innovations like micro-targeting at a larger scale in order
to harness the persuasive potential of social media. Importantly, the intense – maybe even over-
proportional – coverage of the aforementioned phenomena by the mass media contributed to the
perception of an increased political role of social media.
In order to understand these processes and also to keep economic actors like Facebook and Twitter
accountable for their political influence, it is essential for academia to systematically explore new
digital data sources. Yet, online social networks are complex and intransparent sociotechnical web
environments (Strohmaier & Wagner, 2014). Therefore, it is a considerable task to collect digital
trace data at a large scale and at the same time adhere to established academic standards. In
the context of political communication, important challenges are (1) defining the social media
accounts and posts relevant to the campaign (content validity ), (2) operationalizing the venues
where relevant social media activity takes place (construct validity ), (3) capturing all of the relevant
social media activity (reliability ), and (4) sharing as much data as possible for reuse and replication
(objectivity ).
The present collaborative project by GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences and the E-
Democracy Program of the University of Koblenz-Landau conducted such an effort. We concen-
trated on the two social media networks of most political relevance, Facebook and Twitter. These
platforms have different architectures, user bases and usage conventions that need to be taken
into account conceptually and methodologically. Section 2 discusses previous work related to our
endeavor. In Section 3, we lay out what kinds of activities we define as part of the ‘‘political com-
munication space’’ on Facebook and Twitter. Section 4 outlines our data collection. In Section
5, we present exploratory findings of how political communication on the Bundestag campaign
unfolded on social media. Section 6 discusses how we share the main output of the project, the
‘‘BTW17 dataset’’ and lists of election candidates and their social media accounts. We conclude
with a critical reflection of our efforts and an outline of future research avenues in Section 7.
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2 Related Work
A burgeoning literature has analyzed the role of social media during election campaigns. In this
section, we first structure related work according to the logic of data collection. Then we summarize
methodological research that has revealed several pitfalls when collecting social media data. Finally,
we discuss related work on the Bundestag campaign 2017. The predominant focus in the existing
literature clearly lies on Twitter use during election campaigns.1 Generally, one can distinguish
between audience-centered and elite-centered data collections.
Audience-centered designs capture tweets containing a set of hashtags (‘‘#btw17’’) or keywords
related to a campaign (‘‘cdu’’, ‘‘merkel’’). The goal is to reveal how interested users participate in
political debates. From this body of research, we have a pretty good understanding of the dynamics
that unfold during election campaigns in the public Twitterverse. A particular focus lies on ‘‘second
screening’’ during TV debates (Freelon & Karpf, 2015; Lin, Keegan, Margolin, & Lazer, 2014; Trilling,
2015; Vaccari, Chadwick, & O’Loughlin, 2015), influential users (Dubois & Gaffney, 2014; Freelon
& Karpf, 2015; Jürgens, Jungherr, & Schoen, 2011), attempts to predict election results (DiGrazia,
McKelvey, Bollen, & Rojas, 2013; Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, &Welpe, 2010) and the identification
of central political topics (Bruns, Burgess, et al., 2011; Jungherr, Schoen, & Jürgens, 2016; Trilling,
2015).
Elite-centered designs concentrate on a well-defined subset of the Twitterverse, namely specific
accounts of interest. In contrast to audience-centered designs focusing on the demand side of
politics, elite-centered studies concentrate on the supply side of politics, i.e., politicians, parties
or journalists. Moreover, not only the tweets of these users mentioning a political keyword are
of interest, but rather their overall behavioral patterns on social media. Here, studies focused on
the adoption of platforms by politicians (Quinlan, Gummer, Roßmann, & Wolf, 2017; Vergeer, Her-
mans, & Sams, 2013), the (partisan) structure of online networks of candidates (Aragón, Kappler,
Kaltenbrunner, Laniado, & Volkovich, 2013; Lietz, Wagner, Bleier, & Strohmaier, 2014) and their res-
onance with audiences (Kovic, Rauchfleisch, Metag, Caspar, & Szenogrady, 2017; Nielsen & Vaccari,
2013; Yang & Kim, 2017).
Studies of Facebook are more sparse, which is likely due to technical and privacy constraints. Most
Facebook profiles and communication are private, whereas on Twitter, most posts and user profiles
are public. Since retrieving posts via keyword search is only possible for (the few) public posts, stud-
ies of election campaigns on Facebook necessarily have to concentrate on users with public pages.
Thus, most electoral studies are elite-centered in that they concentrate on profiles of politicians
and parties (e.g., Caton, Hall, & Weinhardt, 2015; Kovic et al., 2017; Lev-On & Haleva-Amir, 2016;
Nielsen & Vaccari, 2013; Williams & Gulati, 2013). From this preselection, the analysis sometimes
still moves to the audience, for example the politically active users in the comments sections of
these pages (e.g., Freelon, 2017).
Our project also draws on previous studies that critically assessed the data provided by Twitter’s Ap-
plication Programming Interface (API). Driscoll and Walker (2014) performed a comparison between
the publicly accessible Streaming API (providing up to 1% of live Twitter traffic) and the Gnip Pow-
erTrack Firehose dataset provided by Twitter (granting full access to the Twitter data stream). They
found that during periods of public contention like election campaigns or protests, the Streaming
API returns biased data because the rate limit tends to be surpassed when a social phenomenon
generates a lot of public interest. Similarly, Morstatter, Pfeffer, Liu, and Carley (2013) found that
as a researcher increases the parameters (keywords) of interest, the coverage of the Streaming API
1It is not our goal to review this literature in its entirety. Instead, we focus on commonalities in the predominant data
collection strategies. For a comprehensive literature review on Twitter use during election campaigns, see Jungherr (2016).
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decreases. In the most systematic evaluation to date, Tromble, Storz, and Stockmann (2017) com-
pared the Streaming API and the Search API to a Firehose dataset as a ground truth. While they
identified serious biases in the Search API, they found that the Streaming API returns ‘‘nearly all’’
relevant tweets when rate limits are not reached. Based on this methodological research, we design
a data collection scheme that is robust to the biases inherent to the Twitter API (see Section 4).
In contrast to Twitter, the Facebook Graph API allows the collection of all non-deleted posts for
an unlimited research period. Thus, researchers can design lists of accounts they want to monitor
and even collect data ex post, after an election campaign has unfolded. This has been the standard
approach in academic works, which, however, misses activities such as posts, comments and likes
that got deleted in the meantime. In a first systematic analysis of deletion rates, Bachl (2017)
showed that approximately 18% of user generated content on German political Facebook pages
had been deleted over the span of eight months. Among posts by political actors themselves, only
2.3% of posts could not be retrieved anymore.2 Our own data collection from Facebook generated
two independent datasets that are susceptible to these limitations to various degrees (see Section
4).
As for studies related to the current Bundestag campaign, Schmidt (2017) collected social media
accounts of all candidates. In his study, he describes the adoption of social media by candidates and
their follower relationships on Twitter. Yet, in addition to this metadata that can also be accessed ex
post, our project also collected the contents of candidates’ tweets as well as candidates’ interactions
with other users in real time. Another project collected data at a larger scale, albeit exclusively on
Twitter (Kratzke, 2017).3 Apart from being limited to one platform, this project only collected data
for 360 politicians, mostly sitting members of the Bundestag. Such a convenience sample only
allows for limited substantive analyses.
In the following section, we describe which target concepts we consider essential to be covered
during an election campaign. Furthermore, we describe how they can be operationalized on social
media. In our definition of the ‘‘political communication space’’, we chose a hybrid approach that
integrates both, audience-centered and elite-centered research designs.
3 Defining the Political Communication Space
Our goal was to collect all publicly available political communication related to the Bundestagswahl
on Facebook and Twitter. To this end, we define three target concepts on which political communi-
cation is typically centered: (1) politicians, here Facebook pages and Twitter accounts of candidates
in the election campaign, (2) Facebook pages and Twitter accounts of political parties and gatekeep-
ers such as media organizations, and (3) keywords denoting central political topics on Twitter. This
holistic conceptualization not only covers the most important actors, but also aims to capture the
online engagement of regular citizens with politics. For politicians and parties, we have confined
our data to those parties that had, based on polls, a realistic chance to win seats in parliament.4
Figure 1 visualizes the conceptualization which we will explain in detail in this section.
2We could not incorporate these insights in our project, as Bachl presented first findings in a conference presentation only
on 22 September 2017.
3We are aware that various other teams collected specific Twitter data for concrete research questions as well.
4Included parties are AfD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, CDU, CSU, FDP, Linke and SPD.
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Target concepts TwitterFacebook
Candidates
Organizations
Parties
Gatekeepers
Important topics
account timelines
retweets
@-mentions
hashtags
string matches
pages
posts
comments
likes
ID based
string based
Figure 1: The political communication space and its operationalization.
3.1 Candidates
The official list of candidates eligible for the election was not published by the Bundeswahlleiter
until mid of August, just a month before election day and therefore right in the middle of the
campaign. However, our goal was to cover campaign activity as early as possible. Hence, we had
to devote considerable efforts to first compile lists of candidates. This process was guided by the
specifics of the electoral system for the Bundestag, mixed-member proportional representation.
50 percent of members of parliament are elected via relative majority in electoral districts (direct
candidates). The other 50 percent are chosen from party lists elected by the regional divisions of
parties in the 16 federal states (list candidates).
In case of list candidates, the process of identification was helped by the fact that most parties
at state level published this information on their websites rather early. For the direct candidates,
a comprehensive (web) search was required, because the nomination process is based at the local
level. The preparation of the candidate list was a continuous process with the benchmark being the
official list published in August.5
Based on the candidate lists we identified the respective Facebook pages and Twitter accounts
of the candidates. The main source were the websites of politicians and parties linking to social
media accounts. In other cases we used Facebook’s and Twitter’s search and look-up functionality
along the following (soft) criteria: Do the name, self-description and/or photos correspond to the
politician? Is the account mentioned/linked in relevant conversations? Is the content of post real
(or satire, e.g., in the case of Angela Merkel parody accounts on Twitter)? For Twitter, we collected
one account per person and for Facebook, we collected up to two accounts, regardless of being a
page or profile.
After the election, we compared our data to two similar datasets that became public at the time.6
While we covered a substantially larger number of accounts (199% more than the Tagesspiegel,
195% more than the Open Knowledge Foundation), we still added 151 Facebook accounts and 52
Twitter accounts from these datasets to our final list.
The data on candidates including available attributes and their social media accounts can be down-
loaded from Stier, Bleier, Bonart, et al. (2018).
5Our original search missed only two percent of candidates (52 of the 2,516 final candidates). On the other hand, we
identified 45 individuals who did not end up being an official candidate. The latter resulted mostly from disorganized/fluid
processes and conflicts within party organizations, especially in the case of the AfD.
6These are a collection made by the Tagesspiegel featuring candidates’ Facebook and Twitter accounts (http://wahl
.tagesspiegel.de/2017/kandidatenbank) and data from the Open Knowledge Foundation on Facebook accounts (https://
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1l1JO13aDCcTFHoVD0KjWFHSCe6h3joPjBiSJxKcZFkE).
Social Media Monitoring 9
3.2 Organizations: Political Parties and Gatekeepers
Besides candidates, there are additional influential accounts on social media during election cam-
paigns, most importantly, accounts by political parties and news media. Likewise, their Twitter
accounts and Facebook pages were researched for the construction of an ‘‘organizations’’ dataset.
The list of relevant party actors contains all accounts of the national parties, their caucuses in the
Bundestag (‘‘Bundestagsfraktion’’), the parties in the federal states (‘‘Landesparteien’’) and youth
organizations (e.g., the Jusos). Parties at all these different levels predominantly focused on the
Bundestag campaign during our research period. At the same time, future research should also
incorporate the local party branches (e.g., CDU Cologne).
In addition to these party actors, we also compiled lists of accounts belonging to the right-wing
protest movement Pegida that generate a lot of engagement on German social media (Stier et
al., 2017). It was to be expected that these accounts would form part of the right-wing media
ecosystem during the election campaign.
In order to compile a list of media accounts, we crowdsourced the account names of German media
present on Facebook and Twitter. On the crowdsourcing platform CrowdFlower7, we asked German
crowdworkers to find links to German media accounts (‘‘mainstream media” as well as ‘‘alternative
media”) that report on political topics. The rationale behind using (and paying) crowdworkers for
this task was to construct a diverse set of accounts that also captures the long tail of media ac-
counts. In total, we collected 6,211 responses from crowdworkers on Twitter media accounts (2,815
unique accounts) and 4,774 responses on Facebook media accounts (2,049 unique accounts). All
media accounts with more than one mention were then manually looked through by the first author
who screened out non-German accounts and non-related genres like YouTube Stars. The final list
of media pages on Facebook contains 285 accounts, the list of media accounts on Twitter comprises
310 accounts.
3.3 Political Topics
Finally, to monitor central political topics we built a list of related keywords (‘‘selectors’’). We
predefined a broad set of relevant keywords before the election and decided not to add additional
selectors during the campaign. The main reason for this decision is that if a researcher includes new
trends, she will always be too late as these can only be identified when they are already popular
on social media or in public debates. Thus we first opted for the more systematic approach with a
fixed set of topics, before retrospectively capturing additional campaign topics, as explained later.
The selection of keywords related to a topic is a process prone to human biases (King, Lam, &
Roberts, 2017). Thus, our choice of selectors is certainly not objective but rather reflects ex ante
expectations by the project team which topics and actors would become important during the
campaign. We also had to consider two potentially distorting aspects. First, some keywords were
used very frequently in other languages and would have flooded our data collection. For instance,
we found out that ‘‘fdp’’ is an abbreviation very frequently used in French and Portuguese tweets.
Thus we added some keywords with a hashtag, e.g. ‘‘#fdp’’ that most often refers to the German
party. Second, some surnames are not unique identifiers for German politicians. The word ‘‘gabriel’’,
e.g., is a word used very often in Spanish, thus we included the full name ‘‘sigmar gabriel’’.
We minimize the number of missing relevant messages as we have such a holistic conceptualization
of political actors and topics. Many messages on newly emerging topics still contain mentions of
7www.crowdflower.com
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known candidates, party names or leading candidates. However, the share of relevant communica-
tion neglected by our definition of the political communication space is impossible to evaluate – a
bias that is inherent to any such data collection effort.
As a starting point for the construction of our selectors list, we used the keywords already collected
in the social media data collection conducted by GESIS in 2013 (Kaczmirek et al., 2014). Many of
these are universally relevant (e.g., ‘‘finanzpolitik’’ or ‘‘tvduell’’). Furthermore, collecting these again
enables us to directly compare two federal election campaigns in Germany.
Analogous to 2013, we added keywords referring to political institutions and democracy in general,
i.e., the German polity (Appendix A1). Based on the list from 2013 and an investigation of the
recent political agenda, we added keywords on issues (policy ). This includes traditional fields such
as social policy or economic policy, but also topics of particular importance in 2017. For the list of
selectors related to policy, we refer to Appendix A2.
We also captured keywords related to politics, in particular on the ongoing election campaign
(Appendix A3). Among these are popular generic hashtags like ‘‘btw17’’ and political TV events
(‘‘tvduell’’) that typically generate a lot of attention on Twitter (Freelon & Karpf, 2015; Jungherr et
al., 2016; Stier, Bleier, Lietz, & Strohmaier, 2018; Trilling, 2015).
Last, our selectors list comprised keywords related to political parties (Appendix A4). This includes
the names of the established parties that are not only @-mentioned as organizational accounts
very frequently, but also mentioned in free text (as ‘‘political topics’’ in our logic) without an @-
prefix. Moreover, we include the names of the leading candidates (‘‘Spitzenkandidaten’’). This is of
particular importance as the leading candidate of the CDU Angela Merkel does not have a Twitter
account. We also included the names of cabinet members in the federal government and the prime
ministers of German states (‘‘Bundesländer’’), as of beginning of July 2017.
During the campaign, we assembled keywords that were relevant but not captured by our original
list.8 In order to capture these ex post, we used a script to scrape tweets containing these key-
words from the Twitter interface allowing us to track topics until their first emergence. Yet this
approach has the limitation that retweets are excluded from the interface and that deleted tweets
are not available anymore. We were able to capture up to 100 retweets of these original tweets
by retrospectively connecting to the Twitter REST API. Through this process, we added additional
2,136,620 tweets to our data. While this approach is not as systematic as the live streaming and has
several inherent biases, we opted for still adding these tweets to our collection. We will evaluate
the performance of this procedure with data we are currently buying from the data vendor Twitter
Enterprise.
4 Data Collection
At the outset, it is important to note that we only collect publicly available information from so-
cial media. We collect these digital traces of user activity from the Facebook Graph API and the
Twitter Streaming API. In principal, all online interactions of users such as politicians and politi-
cally active individuals can be relevant for social science research. Building on the above defined
political communication space, we are first interested in the tweets and Facebook posts of political
candidates and organizations. Second, we collect the engagement of users with these contents –
8These included ‘‘weidel’’, the AfD politician who only rose to prominence during the campaign, ‘‘flüchtling’’ and ‘‘mi-
granten’’ which we missed in our original list, and the party campaign hashtags ‘‘fedidwgugl’’, ‘‘traudichdeutschland’’,
‘‘holdirdeinlandzurück’’, ‘‘denkenwirneu’’, ‘‘lustauflinks’’, ‘‘darumgruen’’, ‘‘zeitfürmartin’’.
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retweets and @-mentions on Twitter, comments, shares and likes on Facebook. Third, we likewise
consider keywords in messages. Finally, we also collect data from Twitter on follower relationships.
The following subsections elaborate on how we technically monitored this political communication
space.
4.1 Data Retrieval from Twitter
While Twitter can provide a transparent source of data, achieving this transparency requires to be
precise on the data collection process. Building on the set of account names as described above, we
used Twitter’s Streaming API9 to collect messages sent by candidates, replies and retweets of these
messages as well as messages sent to candidates (@-mentions), starting on 5 July. Using the same
method, we collected the analogous messages for political parties and gatekeepers (the selection
logic ‘‘organizations’’ described before). Furthermore, we captured messages containing at least one
keyword from our list of political topics. The employed software includes Tweepy10 and Twitter4J11
for retrieval as well as MongoDB12 for storing the data. Overall, we took extraordinary precautions
to ensure the completeness of the collected data such as independent parallel collections by the
project teams at our two institutions.
Furthermore, we retrieved the follower graph for the monitored candidate accounts on 27 June
2017, 14 September 2017, 1 November 2017 and 9 January 2018. That way we know who followed
politicians and whom they followed at different time points during the campaign. We retrieved
the much larger follower graph for party and organizations accounts on 1 July 2017 (collecting 48
million connections).
4.2 Data Retrieval from Facebook
As elaborated above, the data that can be accessed and monitored publicly differs between so-
cial media platforms. On Facebook, a researcher can only collect data from public pages. As a
consequence, political posts from non-public accounts (that many candidates also used) and con-
versations among Facebook friends or in closed groups can not be analyzed. The public portion of
Facebook data can be accessed via the Facebook Graph API.13
Given these constraints, we define the political communication space on Facebook as posts, com-
ments and likes on public political pages by candidates and organizations. We set up two data
collections. The first scheme collected data using an eight-day rolling time window starting on 15
August. This means that comments and likes on a given post were collected eight days after its
creation. The rationale behind this approach is that most activity happens in the few days after a
post had been created. We also set up a second dataset by retrieving Facebook data from all target
accounts after the campaign. However, we recently got aware of the findings of Bachl (2017) who
showed that such ex post data collections suffer from considerable deletion rates. Thus, we opted
to report data from the first, continuous collection made during the campaign – even though its
temporal coverage is more limited.
9http://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/filter-realtime
10http://tweepy.org
11http://twitter4j.org
12http://mongodb.com
13http://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api
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5 Exploratory Analysis
This section presents several exploratory analyses of our dataset covering the research period from
6 July to 30 September, one week after the election. We first evaluate available language filters
that should be applied when analyzing a national election campaign. Next, we explore our dataset,
focusing on (1) temporal patterns, (2) attention patterns on Twitter, i.e., which topics were the most
salient in public discussions on the campaign and (3) activities and engagement by political parties.
5.1 Data Cleaning
As discussed in Section 3, every conceptualization of the political communication space will un-
doubtedly include posts unrelated to German politics (e.g., ‘‘özdemir’’ is the name of a leading
candidate from the German Green party, but also a popular name in Turkey). This ‘‘noise’’ is less of
a problem on Facebook, since all posts in our dataset have been contributed to a Facebook page
relevant to German politics. Even if a user comments in another language choosing an entirely
non-political topic on a page of one of our target accounts, this user still has intentionally chosen
to contribute to the German political communication space.
However, on Twitter, where we take out tweets from a large universe of messages posted in many
different languages, ambiguities in the meaning of keywords become more of a problem. Moreover,
international debates on German leaders or the campaign are not relevant or even distorting in the
context of most social science research questions that still focus on the national arena. Many
tweets on Angela Merkel, for instance, are coming from outside of Germany. These are related to
her role in world politics, her relationship with Donald Trump or are very critical of her refugee
policies (those tweets are often coming from the U.S. alt right).
Table 1: Evaluation of language filters
False positives False negatives
Twitter language interface DE 14 (0.028%) 121 (0.242%)
Twitter machine learning DE 2 (0.004%) 15 (0.03%)
In order to filter out tweets from non-German users and also reduce the amount of topically non-
related ‘‘noise’’, we applied and evaluated two filtering approaches.14 The first approach restricted
the dataset to only those tweets by users who chose the interface language German in their Twitter
settings (Jungherr et al., 2016). Second, we selected only tweets that were labeled as German by
Twitter’s machine learning algorithm. Then we randomly sampled and coded 4×500 tweets from
our dataset in order to assess the false negative and false positive rates of each approach. Results
are reported in Table 1.
It becomes clear that the Twitter machine learning approach is superior to a filtering based on the
interface language. A non-trivial percentage of users who are tweeting in German on the election
campaign are running their interfaces in other languages – most often English. Meanwhile, the
14One additional source of ‘‘noise’’ is non-human activity. Our approach filters out bot activity in languages other than Ger-
man which targets trending hashtags with spam and advertisements. Moreover, a recent study found that the percentage
of messages sent by political bots on Twitter on the German election was only minor (Neudert, Kollanyi, & Howard, 2017).
Note, however, that this study was based on an ad hoc sample of one million tweets on only select hashtags. Additionally,
the authors define ‘‘highly automated accounts’’ as users tweeting more than 50 times per day on the election, which is
certainly debatable.
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Figure 2: Facebook activities in our dataset by selection logic.
machine learning misclassifies only 2 of 500 non-German tweets as German and 15 of 500 German
tweets as non-German. In total, the language of only 0.017% of tweets is classified incorrectly
by Twitter’s machine learning algorithm. Therefore, we use the tweets that have been labeled as
German by Twitter for our exploratory analysis of the Bundestag election campaign.
5.2 Temporal Patterns
We start our presentation of results with a description of the Facebook and Twitter datasets. The
first purpose is to describe the raw data we collected before moving to more substantive analyses.
Figure 2 shows the daily Facebook activity over time as measured by posts, comments and likes. As
is to be expected, the activity clearly increases with election day on 24 September approaching. On
election night, Facebook posts by candidates, party organizations and gatekeepers received more
than 1.5 million likes and more than 300,000 comments.
Figure 3 displays the analogous data for Twitter, except that here we were also able to collect tweets
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(a) Unfiltered (b) With German filter
Figure 3: Tweets in our dataset by selection logic.
containing keywords on political topics. Panel (a) shows the unfiltered dataset, that is all tweets
we collected.15 Just like in the case of Facebook, activity on Twitter is highest around election day.
However, there are four more spikes in the time series: the first two, the G20 summit in Hamburg
on 7/8 July 2017 and the terror attack in Barcelona on 17 August 2017, are not immediately related
to the Bundestag campaign. Nonetheless, both events were related to political actors and topics
that are prominently featured in our political communication space. The third noteworthy peak
in Twitter activity is related to the ‘‘TV Duell’’ between the leading candidates Merkel (CDU) and
Schulz (SPD) on 3 September 2017.
The figures indicate that Twitter is the more event-driven medium, as the increases in volume
related to ongoing political events are usually of a higher magnitude than on Facebook. It is an
established finding in political communication that the Twitterverse intensively reacts to TV events
during election campaigns. In fact, politicians themselves prefer Twitter over Facebook for ‘‘dual
screening’’ purposes (Stier, Bleier, Lietz, & Strohmaier, 2018).
As discussed before, all posts by media organizations were included in these figures based on the raw
data. Many of the Facebook posts and tweets by media organizations are of course non-political
and thus not immediately relevant to the campaign. We provide the account handles and IDs of
these accounts (Stier, Bleier, Bonart, et al., 2018), which allows a researcher who has reconstructed
our dataset to remove tweets, Facebook posts and interactions of these accounts if preferred for
her analysis.
5.3 Attention on Twitter
This section explores the attention the Twitterverse devoted to different topics and actors. Twit-
ter comes closest to an online ‘‘public sphere’’ that reacts to external events happening during a
campaign. In contrast, Facebook is a medium dominated by reciprocal interactions, thus, the page
owner has more influence on setting the agenda by choosing which topics to post on.
Figure 4 shows the most frequently mentioned political topics as predefined by the selectors found
in Appendix A1 to A4.16 Most attention was devoted to the AfD, followed by mentions of the two
15Note that this figure includes duplicates since a tweet will be collected twice if it addresses multiple target concepts. To
give an example including a mention of a candidate and a topic selector: ‘‘@MartinSchulz has won the #tvduell’’.
16As we are interested in general attention patterns, we also include the appearance of selectors in combination with other
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Figure 4: Top 20 mentioned selectors in our dataset.
larger parties (CDU, SPD, ‘‘groko’’ which stands for the governing ‘‘grand coalition’’ of the two) as
well as their leading candidates Merkel and Schulz. We also find some generic terms like Bundestag
or btw17, the foreign policy issue Turkey and the term refugees. Based on that figure, it seems that
campaigning online resembles offline politics to a close extent – most attention is devoted to the
leading parties and candidates (see also Yang & Kim, 2017), with the outlier being the AfD.
5.4 Activity and Resonance by Party
Public and academic observers have put a particular focus on the use of social media by political
parties and candidates. Thus, our report relies on our exhaustive data to investigate how political
actors themselves have used social media and how their activities were received by citizens.
In Table 2, we first list the number of candidates who were running in the campaign for the seven
main parties, next the number of candidates for which we found at least one Facebook or Twitter
account and finally for how many candidates data could be retrieved during our research period
(i.e., a candidate had a public and active account). 84% of Bundestag candidates maintained a
Facebook account, while 49% had a presence on Twitter. Moreover, for 710 candidates, we found
a second Facebook account for which we also collected data. There is a considerable difference in
the retrieval rates for Facebook (48%) and Twitter (67%). The lower retrieval rates on Facebook
are due to the fact that many accounts were set up as user profiles or private accounts (instead
of accounts declared as Facebook pages). In contrast, almost all Twitter accounts were public, but
approximately one third of candidates with a Twitter presence never tweeted during the campaign.
words like ‘‘#noafd’’ or when these are part of mentioned screennames like @AfDBerlin.
16 GESIS Papers 2018|04
Table 2: Social media adoption and number of retrieved accounts by party candidates
Party Candidates FB accounts public & active FB TW accounts public & active TW
AfD 388 287 126 139 75
CDU 477 400 196 208 120
CSU 90 82 40 55 33
FDP 367 329 160 185 125
Grüne 360 313 114 212 174
Linke 355 290 123 163 109
SPD 479 408 252 261 181
Total 2,516 2,109 1011 1,222 817
We compared these results to the ones reported by Schmidt (2017). To be clear, the comparison is
based on our final dataset that includes the candidate accounts we added from the Tagesspiegel and
Open Knowledge Foundation databases. Schmidt and his team found a Facebook account (pages or
profiles) for 1,849 candidates from the seven parties we focus on, compared to 2,109 in Table 2. He
reports 1,096 candidates with a Twitter account, our final dataset contains 1,222 Twitter accounts.
Next, we turn to the resonance that political actors attract on social media. This gives indications
on whether the considerable staff and resources needed to maintain a social media presence are
worth the effort. For this, we use measurements of social media influence that are established in the
literature (e.g., (Kovic et al., 2017; Nielsen & Vaccari, 2013; Yang & Kim, 2017). Note, however, that
these metrics need to be interpreted with caution as they are particularly susceptible to automated
activity by bots or astroturfing campaigns coordinated by humans (Keller, Schoch, Stier, & Yang,
2017). It also has to be kept in mind that deletions before the 8-day rolling time window of our
data collection are not included here. Deletions are, however, less frequent for party posts than for
user generated content (Bachl, 2017).
Figure 5 shows the top five accounts per party according to how many Facebook page likes they
have accumulated. Accounts of leading politicians and the main party accounts dominate the
list. When looking at the averages per party, we cannot find clear-cut differences. However, this
count highly depends on the number of included accounts and how many candidates are on party
lists. Overall, there are no apparent asymmetries between parties in the number of page likes they
attracted.
In Figure 6, the same plot is displayed for the number of followers on Twitter, i.e., the people who
regularly receive messages from political actors in their Twitter timelines. While Angela Merkel
is the person with most page likes on Facebook, Martin Schulz leads the field in terms of Twit-
ter followers. This is unsurprising, as Angela Merkel does not have a Twitter account and Schulz
has gained international followers during his time as president of the European parliament. It is
interesting to contrast the paltry follower numbers of leading and average AfD politicians to the
prominent role of the AfD in the topics that were discussed on Twitter (see Figure 4). Their lower
number of followers notwithstanding, the party still overshadowed Twitter debates through various
escalations in campaign rhetoric. This indicates that even though the AfD dominates Facebook and
Twitter discourses, the tone of these debates (support for the AfD vs. negative depictions) might
be rather different.
In our final analysis, we move beyond the page level and investigate the actual engagement of
audiences with contents produced by parties. This might be a better indicator for the ‘‘success’’ of
online campaigns. As Figure 7 makes strikingly clear, the AfD was by far the most successful party
on Facebook in terms of engagement. Even though AfD candidates and party branches only posted
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Figure 5: Top five Facebook accounts by page likes for each party on a logged scale. The black lines
represent party averages.
Figure 6: Top five Twitter accounts by the number of followers for each party on a logged scale.
The black lines represent party averages.
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Figure 7: Aggregated Facebook posts and received engagement (comments, likes and shares) by
party.
an average number of posts, they received higher numbers of likes, comments and in particular
shares than other parties. Likes and shares can be regarded as the clearest indications for political
support, while comments tend to be distributed more evenly since they are also used to criticize
account holders.
Overall, these results suggest that the AfD was successful in generating the most (positive or neg-
ative) attention during the election campaign. This echoes results from previous studies (Neudert
et al., 2017; Stier et al., 2017) and media reports on the AfD’s extensive social media operations.17
Further research should investigate how AfD accounts are intertwined with supporter groups and
so-called ‘‘alternative media’’ pages.18 There is mounting evidence that especially on Facebook, a
right-wing media ecosystem has emerged that continues to influence German online discourses
after the election campaign.
6 Data Sharing
The data we collected is proprietary data owned by Facebook and Twitter. Because of that and
due to privacy restrictions, it is not possible to share the raw data with other researchers or the
public. However, there are possibilities to reconstruct social media datasets, which is important in
order to promote reproducibility in digital research (Kinder-Kurlanda, Weller, Zenk-Möltgen, Pfeffer,
17http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/gezielte-grenzverletzungen-so-aggressiv-macht-die-afd-wahlkampf-auf-facebook
-1.3664785-2
18Account names of such online media can also be downloaded from Stier, Bleier, Bonart, et al. (2018).
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Figure 8: Interface of the online monitoring tool.
& Morstatter, 2017). Twitter allows the publication of tweet IDs for academic purposes. Using
these unique numeric identifiers, researchers can reconstruct our Twitter dataset. We publish our
masterlist of accounts which allows for the reconstruction of the Facebook dataset – with certain
limitations in ex post data availability (Bachl, 2017). The necessary data for the reconstruction of
the Twitter and Facebook datasets can be found at Stier, Bleier, Bonart, et al. (2018).
While raw social media data cannot be shared, researchers can publish aggregated information from
the metadata or text of social media posts. Thus, we provide an online access to our dataset that
allows researchers to track the salience of topics of interest in customized searches. The resulting
time series show how the salience of terms like ‘‘merkel’’ or ‘‘afd’’ develops over time on social media.
In its current beta version, only posts by partisan actors, i.e., party branches and candidate accounts
are included. In further versions, we will include data by regular users posting and commenting on
political matters.
Figure 8 shows a screenshot of the monitoring platform with a time series from Facebook. We used
keywords on the two most realistic coalition options ‘‘jamaika’’ and ‘‘grosse koalition’’ as search
input in this example. The tool not only enables researchers to explore how social media reacts to
unfolding political events, but also to download the data as relative frequencies over time. More-
over, the tool allows for a filtering of the data by party. The monitoring instrument can be accessed
at mediamonitoring.gesis.org.
7 Conclusions
This project aimed to provide guidelines on how to collect social media data in a valid and reli-
able way, with a particular focus on the specifics of political communication. Conceptually, we first
defined relevant target concepts prominent during an election campaign, namely candidates, orga-
nizations like party and media accounts and political topics. We then operationalized and collected
data on these concepts in line with the possibilities and affordances of the two social media plat-
forms Facebook and Twitter. Our temporal analysis showed that social media reacts considerably
to campaign events like the TV debate or election night. In an analysis of party activities and their
reception on social media, we found coherent evidence that the AfD was particularly successful
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in exploiting the potential of social media. Besides accounts of leading figures from other parties,
the AfD generated the highest engagement on Facebook and was also the most talked about party
on Twitter. As the political role of social media continues to grow, researchers will have to con-
tinue focusing on these partisan asymmetries that can only be identified if the data collection goes
beyond a tiny collection of party accounts or campaign hashtags. It is of utmost importance to
analyze political communication across all arenas of election campaigning, also in the long tail of
candidates.
Based on these conceptual and infrastructural foundations, we now maintain a robust data collec-
tion scheme that will continue to monitor social media in Germany. Beyond political communica-
tion, the infrastructure can be activated for collecting data on various events and social phenomena
ranging from election campaigns in other countries to non-political matters. The datasets on the
Bundestag campaign can be reconstructed using the data we uploaded. The ongoing streaming of
data can be searched and accessed via our monitoring tool. We think that these efforts represent
a considerable step towards enhancing replicability and data sharing in social media research.
We also acknowledge several limitations and the need for further infrastructural investments to
fully realize the value of digital behavioral data in the social sciences. The observational data we
collected is limited in that it does not contain important contextual and individual-level informa-
tion such as socio-demographic characteristics, voting behavior or political preferences. The lack
of such data limits the theoretical and empirical value of digital behavioral data. Thus, we see a
lot of potential in the linking of social media datasets with additional data sources like traditional
surveys (Jungherr et al., 2016; Stier, Bleier, Lietz, & Strohmaier, 2018) surveys of social media users
(Vaccari et al., 2015), candidate surveys (Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016; Quinlan et al., 2017) or data from
other sources such as real-time measurements during TV debates (Maier, Hampe, & Jahn, 2016).
It is also clear that our previous data collections and the literature in general have mostly con-
fined themselves to contentious political periods like election campaigns or offline protests. As a
reaction to that, our data mining will continuously run throughout the current legislative session
of the Bundestag. Having longitudinal data will allow social scientists to assess how every-day,
less event-driven political processes manifest themselves on social media. Such data can serve as
an analytical baseline and improve the understanding of whether established findings on online
political communication still hold during less contentious political periods.
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A Appendix
Table A1: Selectors: Polity
bundestag bundesministerin direktmandat
länderfinanzausgleich bundesminister wahlrecht
bundeskanzler landtag landtagswahl
kanzler bürgerentscheid verfassungsgericht
bundeskanzlerin wahlsystem bundesverfassungsgericht
direktedemokratie bundesrat bverfg
direkte demokratie bundespräsident bundesregierung
überhangmandat wähler verfassungsrichter
bundestagswahl
Table A2: Selectors: Policy
finanzpolitik zensur energiewende
steuerpolitik shadowbans klimawandel
staatshaushalt shadow bans kulturpolitik
wirtschaftslage atomkraft schulpolitik
russland atomenergie einkommensungleichheit
türkei antiatom steuergeschenk
syrien endlagerung wirtschaftspolitik
arbeitslosigkeit gorleben integrationspolitik
steuerreform atomausstieg rentenpolitik
vorratsdatenspeicherung überwachung betreuungsgeld
bankenkrise datenschutz frauenquote
finanzkrise überwachung einkommensgerechtigkeit
ezb islamist fachkräftemangel
bankenaufsicht lohnpolitik gesundheitspolitik
finanzmarktsteuer ehefueralle bildungspolitik
agenda 2010 ehefüralle kinderarmut
herdprämie staatsdefizit arbeitsmarktpolitik
einkommensschere ökosteuer altersarmut
jugendarbeitslosigkeit hochschulpolitik solidaritätszuschlag
forschungspolitik hartzIV auslandseinsatz
verkehrspolitik hartz4 elterngeld
familienpolitik hartz 4 freihandel
bundeswehr sozialpolitik flüchtling
umweltpolitik soziale gerechtigkeit fluechtling
rentenreform mindestlohn flüchtlinge
netzpolitik wirtschaftskrise fluechtlinge
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz klimaschutz migranten
netzdg energiepolitik
Social Media Monitoring 25
Table A3: Selectors: Politics / election campaign
wahl17 wahljahr infratest
btw2017 umfrage wahlbeteiligung
btw17 pegida populismus
wahlen2017 forschungsgruppe wahlen populistisch
wahl2017 lügenpresse politikverdrossenheit
kanzlerduell luegenpresse wahlversprechen
tvduell forsa umfrage politiker
elefantenrunde politbarometer wahlwerbung
parteiprogramm emnid meinungsfreiheit
schulzzug allensbach wahlkampf
parteitag
Table A4: Selectors: Parties & leading politicians
grüne karrenbauer steinmeier
bündnis90 altmaier thorsten albig
buendnis90 bouffier woidke
gruene groehe #fdp
goering-eckardt rainer haseloff lindner
göring-eckardt stanislaw tillich npd
goeringeckardt von der leyen piratenpartei
göringeckardt gröhe koalition
kretschmann linkspartei groko
oezdemir bartsch grosse koalition
özdemir wagenknecht große koalition
hofreiter ramelow jamaikakoalition
csu spd ampelkoalition
seehofer schulz schwampel
dobrindt hannelore kraft schwarzgrün
christianschmidt michaelmüller schwarzgelb
afd heiko maas rotgrün
frauke petry carsten sieling fedidwgugl
gauland schwesig traudichdeutschland
weidel sigmar gabriel holdirdeinlandzurück
cdu barbara hendricks denkenwirneu
merkel sellering lustauflinks
schäuble olaf scholz darumgrün
schaeuble malu dreyer darumgruen
maiziere nahles zeitfürmartin
johanna wanka stephan weil zeitfuermartin
